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Folk Concepts

Anthropology is strongly concerned with conceptual analysis in that a large part of its purpose
is to penetrate and interpret cultural meanings. Unlike philosophy and psychology, both of
which devote considerable attention to theories and techniques for studying concepts (which
may be defined as “units of thought”), anthropology’s approach to concepts stresses cultural
particularities or contingencies rather than universals. Anthropology’s distinct contribution to
conceptual analysis lies in its method of eliciting concepts and meanings from people through
participant-observation, which ideally involves extended and fully committed absorption into
their community, during which the anthropologist not only conducts formal interviews but also
aims to learn a culture at a personal level by observing and participating in community life.
This methodology, along with anthropology’s intellectual heritage in studying traditional, often
nonliterate societies, makes the anthropological approach highly suited to the study of folk
concepts. A folk concept is a notion that has a general, popularly understood meaning
particular to a sociocultural grouping, but which has not been formally defined or standardized.
Folk concepts are encoded in discourse, nonverbal behavior, and social practices rather than in
published texts (such as newspapers, magazines, or books) or other media. They could,
however, arise from folk interpretations of texts or other media. Folk concepts and other kinds
of concepts penetrate each other in many ways. For example, the practice of saying grace
before meals may combine culturally specific folk practices with textually based religious
teachings. The important point is that ethnographers discover and interpret folk concepts
based on the study of human behavior rather than on texts. Once folk concepts are recorded in
writing or other media, they are no longer undocumented; but unless such documentation
causes a change in meaning and affects the way people know the concept, they remain folk
concepts.
The folklorist Alan Dundes uses the term folk ideas and defines such ideas as “traditional
notions that a group of people have about the nature of humanity, the world, and life in
general,” “unstated premises which underlie the thought and action of a given group of people”
(Dundes, 2007, p. 185). They are “part of the unconscious or un-self conscious culture of a
people” (Dundes, 2007, p. 189). Such folk ideas are the building blocks of a worldview. Since
people are not fully conscious of them, they must be “extrapolated” from folkloric data. Dundes
overlooks the fact that many unstated traditional notions underlying thought and action do not
directly concern the nature of humanity, the world, or life in general, but are significant only in
some more limited sphere of life.
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Folk concepts may be embedded in oral tradition or spoken discourse, but it is important to
realize that many concepts are not verbalized, for example, knowledge about making craft
items or tying knots, or the practice of saluting the flag as a sign of respect for the country.
Since interviews are carried out in language, nonverbal concepts are more difficult to
interrogate than verbal concepts, and thus, they present a special challenge for ethnographers.
Emic Versus Etic and Related Distinctions
The emic/etic distinction refers to the distinction between the subjective or internal viewpoint
on the one hand and the objective or external viewpoint on the other hand. This distinction,
which can be most simply glossed as “insider” (emic) as compared to “outsider” (etic) outlooks,
has been pondered by many anthropologists, most notably Kenneth L. Pike (who coined the
terms) and Marvin Harris, and it underlies much anthropological work (Headland, Pike, &
Harris, 1990). It is useful in locating the position of folk concepts in anthropological inquiry. Folk
concepts are emic, meaning that they represent the insider’s viewpoint. The concepts
anthropologists use to ground their inquiries come from an external perspective. The external
perspective is called etic. Etic concepts are also objective, scientific, and operational, and they
may yield measurable and falsifiable data. The etic perspective concerns behavior rather than
folk concepts. But the etic approach is usually the starting point for the effort to elicit and
explicate emic folk concepts. The emic/etic distinction underscores the need to differentiate
between observed realities and informants’ statements. This does not mean that etic data are
more important than emic data. Both approaches are needed in field studies, and they provide
complementary data. Emic analysis of concepts is the linking of concepts to other concepts in a
domain. Etic analysis is the linking of concepts to behavior and to outcomes.
Emic concepts emerge from data that are obtained initially through etic inquiries. For example,
an anthropologist studying folk concepts concerning property will begin with anthropological
notions about the characteristics and associations of property, such as those defined in detail in
Outline of Cultural Materials, published by the Human Relations Area Files (Murdock, 2004).
The starting definition of property must be shared by other researchers and based on objective
characteristics. By asking questions about property in a vernacular language, it is possible to
work up folk concepts about property in vernacular terms. These notions and definitions may
express ideals, such as norms for the inheritance of real property. By observing transactions,
the ethnographer may see how much these concepts guide behavior and whether actual
behavior diverges from definitions and concepts. Descriptions of actual behavior pertaining to
property (as locally defined) use etic terms. Emic data concerning unstated assumptions about
property are treated to both emic and etic analysis.

2

Emic and etic knowledge are parts of different models of reality. Rappaport’s distinction
between the cognized model and the operational model of reality is identical to the emic/etic
split. The operational model includes
elements of which the actors are unaware (such as microorganisms and trace
elements) but which affect them in important ways. The cognized model, on the
other hand, may well include components, such as supernaturals, whose
existence cannot be demonstrated by empirical procedures, but whose putative
existence moves the actors to behave in the ways they do. (Rappaport, 1979, p.
98)
Related, too, is the distinction made between beliefs and knowledge, since knowledge is that
set of beliefs that are objectively true, universally applicable, and can be verified empirically. In
the context of health, for example, knowledge might refer to concepts such as the role of the
mosquito in causing malaria, while belief might refer to ideas about malaria being spread by
“bad air” or “miasma.” In environmental anthropology, too, there is a movement to document
indigenous knowledge, which refers to factual, empirical knowledge of the environment and
means of managing resources and to a differentiation between belief and knowledge.
Calling something a belief rather than an instance of knowledge suggests an etic perspective
and implies that the phenomenon or statement represents something that is untrue or does
not exist. The term folk belief suggests that something is erroneous and a potential obstacle to
development. For example, thinking that a child’s illness is caused by a spirit attack may induce
parents to seek help from a spiritual healer rather than a clinic. Pelto and Pelto (1977) pointed
out that differentiating between knowledge and belief based on truth value puts the
ethnographer in the uncomfortable position of having to judge whether a belief is true or not,
whereas the ethnographer’s focus should be on the relationship between belief/knowledge and
practice. For this reason, Pelto and Pelto think it may be useful for ethnographers to lump belief
and knowledge into a single notion, belief/knowledge. To the extent that one wishes to
emphasize that a folk belief is false, one might call such a belief a folk fallacy, as Dundes (2007)
did. Other anthropologists, like Ellen, Parkes, and Bicker (2000), want to emphasize the content
of folk concepts as practical knowledge.
Yet another important distinction of interest to anthropologists studying concepts is between
cognition and affect. Belief and knowledge refer to the cognitive side. Affect refers to the
emotional charge and associations that may involve the five senses. The affective side includes
opinions, attitudes, and levels of emotional commitment to or rejection of something. To the
extent that a folk concept has any affective dimension, part of conceptual analysis is to uncover
that aspect.
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The Ethnographic Method
Ethnography, the chief methodology of cultural anthropology, combines interviewing with
observation and participation. The ethnographer is usually an outsider, and in many cases
ethnography proceeds without an exact plan; or, if there is a plan, then it is revised or even
scratched as one discovers salient topics. Ethnographic research is often undirected (at least at
first), because it may be impossible to know in advance which areas will come into focus. The
informal, ad hoc quality of ethnographic research permits flexibility to focus on problems of
which the ethnographer was initially unaware and to constantly revise and adapt techniques of
inquiry. Through the discovery of salient concepts, the ethnographic project of explaining these
concepts in depth emerges.
The ethnographic method generally aims for total cultural immersion, participation, and
observation in addition to interviews and any other measures or tests. To the extent possible,
and depending on the topic, the ethnographer lives in the community under investigation and
thus can observe or join in activities whenever they occur, rather than going by the
ethnographer’s schedule. The practically unattainable ideal of total immersion underscores the
goal in anthropology of accounting for the total culture.
The ethnographer begins with conversations and the informal asking of questions, and only
later moves on to more formal methods. One of the first considerations is to establish
relationships with interview subjects (informants) who will be sources of information
throughout the study. Depending on the needs of the study, a sample representing different
constituents of the community needs to be recruited. In any case, it is important to have good
demographic data (age, sex, marital status, etc.) and to link all interview data to informants.
Typically, a few informants will stand out as persons who can help explain data obtained from
other informants. Some informants may stand out as “experts” in a given domain (hunting, for
example). In such cases, it is useful to know by what standard the person is an expert and
whether many others in the community agree with such an assessment. The variation in
knowledge among individual persons, for example between experts and laymen, can be tested
by using structured interviews. Garro used illness terms she had previously elicited and
sentence frames (“Does ____ come from eating lots of ‘hot’ foods?”) to examine consensus and
variation in knowledge (or belief) between curers and noncurers in a Tarascan village.
Choice of informants is an important part of ethnography and needs to be analyzed rather than
taken for granted, since informants are rarely selected randomly in a community study. One
should check how representative of the community an individual is. One way to do this is to
work with a broad variety of persons along with one’s key informants.
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Concept Elicitation
The goal of ethnography, as far as the study of folk concepts is concerned, is to explain how
these concepts are understood and used by participants in their context of action and in
relation to other concepts. Before they can be analyzed, concepts first must be identified. In a
naturalistic setting, concepts may come to the ethnographer’s attention without direct
interrogation. Once these concepts have been discovered and identified, the ethnographer can
develop hypotheses about them that can be tested through interviews or conversations with
informants.
For topics that rarely come up in normal conversations, it is possible to start with interviews
only if one already knows which concept one wants to study. Naomi Quinn (2005), who studied
American folk concepts concerning marriage and commitment, used such an approach. As an
American woman, she already knew a great deal about her chosen topic. But her interviews
were open-ended and undirected, with the only directive being that interviewees talked about
their marriages. From these interviews, a small number of themes emerged that Quinn
analyzed as metaphors.
Quinn used interviews to elicit information that would come out in ordinary talk but where
regular participant-observation was not feasible, since marriage is not a subject that ordinarily
comes up in public discourse. Interviewers took note of keywords and phrases used by
interviewees along with paralinguistic and kinesthetic cues. They let interviewees talk with a
minimum of interruptions or questions, with the hope of getting people to open up about their
reasoning processes as shown in notions about cause and effect. Afterward, they guided each
subject through a checklist of questions about all aspects of marriage in general, and their own
marriages in particular, that had come up in the previous interviews.
In such an approach, concepts emerge through conversation and the informal asking of
questions. The informal approach moves to a more formal method when terms or expressions
are compiled that encapsulate what the ethnographer thinks are concepts, and interview
subjects (informants) are asked questions about each term. In taking notes on the interview,
the ethnographer records observations about nonverbal behavior as well as verbal answers. In
many cases, it is useful to obtain information on affect and personal experiences relating to a
concept.
Part of elicitation, beyond casual interviewing, is to get at those aspects of concepts that are
below the surface of consciousness. Complex concepts are not explained just through words;
one is informed about them through observation, practice, and sometimes participation.
Anthropologists must strive to maintain objectivity in documenting not only their informants’
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subjectivity but also their own in this learning process, accounting for the effects of their
presence in the mix.
The ethnographic method is chiefly descriptive and observational rather than experimental.
However, certain experiments can be done with informants by having them perform a certain
task or respond to a list of questions. The more formalized an ethnographic approach is, the
closer it approximates experimental science procedures. An example of a semiexperimental
approach is to have an informant name every plant he knows, while counting the number of
plants he cannot name within a circumscribed plot of land (Bernstein, Ellen, & Antaran, 1997).
A methodological problem is that a vocabulary is needed to elaborate a concept, even though
the concept may not be a verbal one. For example, concepts about food involve the five senses
as well as actions and behaviors involving food preparation, storage, eating, and so forth. The
terminology of food may not reflect the full richness of the concepts. Yet, this vocabulary is an
opening-up point for interrogation about food concepts.
Holy and Stuchlik (1983) maintained that the study of folk concepts (“notions”) is rather
straightforward in terms of data collection but that the interpretation of these notions poses
problems in terms of relating them to actions. People use and know about many concepts that
they cannot define. The concepts’ meanings are obscure and inscrutable, even though they are
used in actual practice. These complex concepts may be “fundamental notions.” Boyer (1990)
gave as an example in the Fang concept of evur, which is generally glossed as “witchcraft
substance” or “witchcraft organ” but which he says is far more complex, since “people have
extremely vague views on what evur actually consists of and the mechanism of the action” (p.
26), even though they are clear about the effects of evur and the social relations revolving
around evur-related actions. Boyer finds that these vague kinds of concepts, which he considers
“vacuous,” tend to be the focus of traditional symbolism and practices. He notes that there are
three kinds of discourse in which such concepts occur: common discourse, gossip, and expert
discourse; only the last is both definite and reliable. Most people use such a concept and its
verbal label without knowing what it really means. The same can be said about technical
knowledge that is not mystified: For example, people use notions of electricity and telephony
without knowing or understanding the science and technology underlying them. The
“anthropology of experience” (Turner & Bruner, 1986) takes into account the processes by
which concepts are learned and the feelings associated with learning and transmitting them.
When starting research, the ethnographer knows neither the criteria nor the limits of a domain.
The “free listing” approach can be used to elicit terms that can provide information on the
domain. By asking different kinds of informants to list all the kinds of X they know, it is possible
to determine the salience of certain items and how knowledge of them is distributed within the
society. This may help the ethnographer map the concept. More formal analysis can be used to
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determine the perceived similarities and differences between terms within a conceptual
domain using sorting. Through successive sorts, it is possible to discern the clustering of data
into taxonomies (Weller & Romney, 1988).
Informal interviews can be used to ask about the extent of a concept. In asking about spirits, for
example, one might ask the informant to name every spirit known to him or her, along with the
spirits’ attributes and locations and any other information about them. If the ethnographer can
obtain a comprehensive list using this technique, then the process is reversed by asking
informants about each item (in this case a spirit entity) on the list. Such a method, when given
to a range of informants, will provide a sense of the extent of a concept in its domain.
Symbolic and Cognitive Anthropology
A focus on cultural meanings spawned movements in cognitive and symbolic anthropology,
both of which led theoretical developments and ethnographic practices in the 1960s and 1970s.
Present approaches to the anthropology of folk concepts and meanings are descended from
these earlier schools of thought. (Indeed, certain anthropology departments were closely
identified with either cognitive or symbolic anthropology.) Cognitive anthropologists zeroed in
on language usage, but their aim was to uncover the classificatory principles such as
taxonomies and paradigms underlying identifiable domains such as property, kinship, or the
spirit world. While the terms just used are etic, cognitive anthropologists sought to lay bare
emic domains using linguistic models. Cognitive anthropologists viewed ethnographic
description as specifying what one needs to know in order to function appropriately within a
given role in a society as well as what is appropriate knowledge for behavior.
Agar (1966), a cognitive anthropologist, advised that to obtain information on folk concepts,
one should get informants to contrast terms or sort them into categories or give them values
(e.g., numbers on a scale, rank order based on a given criterion). The field of meanings of
concepts is based on relations between terms. For example, A is a kind of B, A is used for B, A is
part of B, A is a process of B. Questions are asked in the form of a frame, a sentence with a
blank word to be filled in, for example, “A _________ is a kind of car,” or “A father’s sister’s
husband is called _______.”
The symbolic anthropologists had a somewhat different agenda. The field of symbolic
anthropology emphasized salient concepts that were thought to symbolize other things and
have pervasive meanings relating to core values and ultimate realities. A classic example is the
mudyi (“milk”) tree, which has a variety of emotionally compelling but contradictory
significations in Ndembu culture, as analyzed by Turner (1967). Pointing out that the mudyi tree
combines two polar aspects of meaning (natural/biological and sociomoral), he identifies the
mudyi tree as a dominant symbol. Similarly, Ortner looks for focal, master, or “key” symbols in
7

a society. As for how we would know that a symbol is salient, Ortner provides some helpful
guidelines: (1) The natives tell us X is important, (2) the natives seem positively or negatively
aroused by X rather than indifferent to it, (3) X comes up in many different contexts, (4) X is
culturally elaborated through vocabulary, folklore, and so on, and (5) numerous cultural
restrictions surround X. The symbols of interest to symbolic anthropologists sum up and
condense pervasive cultural themes and may metaphorically extend to views about life and the
world.
Early cognitive anthropology was heavily linguistic, with language categories assumed to be
equivalent to conceptual categories. Subsequent anthropologists in the cognitivist tradition,
such as Maurice Bloch (1998), warn against a view of cognition that relies mainly on language,
and they recommend the theory of connectionism, in which thought is seen to occur in clumps
with multiple interconnections working simultaneously rather than sequentially. Bloch uses
such an approach to explicate Zafimaniry concepts of the person, gender, and the natural
environment, arguing that this knowledge, which “goes without saying” in Zafimaniry society, is
best learned through ordinary participant observation rather than interrogation. Cultural
knowledge is only partly lexical and is also tactile, visual, aural, gustatory, and olfactory. This
view is shared by William Merrill (1988) in his study of Rarámuri (Tarahumara) religion,
particularly concepts of the soul. Merrill found that folk concepts were tacit rather than explicit
and were transmitted mainly through nonverbal practices such as community events, drinking
parties, and healing. Depth psychology techniques akin to psychoanalysis may also be used to
elicit folk concepts that are not verbalized. Ultimately, even these techniques rely on verbal
statements. As a result, some ethnographers have attempted to learn techniques themselves
through apprenticeship. Such an approach seems appropriate in gaining access to knowledge
about arts such as weaving, sculpting, or dance.
The nonverbalizable concept is perhaps a material object, either crafted, like the Hopi kachina,
or occurring in nature, such as the aforementioned mudyi tree in Ndembu culture. The ideology
surrounding such objects can be complex. Among the Taman, the stones used by shamans in
curing patients are supposed to be neither natural nor manmade but to have been transformed
from pathogenic spirits during initiation ceremonies. These stones are central to healing
practices in Taman society; their individual identities are revealed to practitioners in dreams
(Bernstein, 1997).
Symbolic anthropology, previously concerned with abstract and disembodied meanings, has
evolved into interpretive anthropology, with an eye open to practices, embodiment, and power
relations. But the notions of symbolic and cognitive anthropology have both come to seem
outdated, as succeeding generations of anthropologists search for fresh approaches to cultural
meanings that will avoid the shortcomings of those fields: for cognitive anthropology, an
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exposition of trivial domains; and for symbolic anthropology, a sense of self-indulgence and
unclear demarcations between folk concepts and the ethnographer’s own ideas and
interpretations. Symbolic and cognitive anthropology have at times joined forces, and both
fields can be revitalized by expanding their horizons (Colby, Fernandez, & Kronenfeld, 1981),
but future research on folk concepts will probably draw on theories of meaning and knowledge
originating outside anthropology.
The Breadth of Topics
Anthropology’s involvement with folk concepts has spanned the gamut from “exotic” to
“mundane” topics. Many scholars have observed and complained about anthropology’s stress
on peculiar, exotic phenomena in the cultures they study and particularly on the conceptual
systems underlying behavior. Keesing (1985) maintained that the tendency in anthropology to
translate folk concepts as nouns rather than verbs gives them a mystical aura they would not
otherwise have. This has the result of attributing to people’s belief systems invisible beings and
mysterious substances. Folk concepts can get reified as well, because they are considered
“traditional,” which implies that they do not change over time. Ethnographic studies carried
over a given stretch of time cannot show whether or not a concept ever changes.
The more exotic areas of inquiry have involved concepts of illness in which folk terms for
illnesses do not correspond to a single illness as defined in scientific medicine. This is often
because the principles by which illness is defined are different from those used in scientific
medicine. A classic study by Frake (1961) on Subanun concepts and vocabulary about skin
ailments reflected classificatory principles of diagnostic criteria and levels of specificity.
Through interrogation, Frake was able to reveal the structure of Subanun concepts about these
illnesses. Even more exotic are culture-bound syndromes, which are specific to certain ethnic
groups. These include amok in the Philippines (“running amuck”), susto (“magical fright”) in
Hispanic America, latah in Malaysia, and windigo psychosis among North American Indian
tribes. Although these may be said to be psychiatric disorders, they do not translate into any
standard psychiatric categories and have culturally specific, often paradoxical,
symptomatologies. An illness like windigo psychosis, which involves humans who are
transformed into monsters who have cannibalistic urges, can only be understood in terms of
folk concepts. Other culture-bound syndromes also have bizarre characteristics: Koro is
characterized by a fear that the genitals or breasts will retract into the body, resulting in death,
and latah is characterized by the blurting out of obscenities upon being startled (Simons &
Hughes, 1985). These illnesses raise questions not only for anthropology (in the interplay and
entanglement between emic and etic) but also in psychology and psychiatry about the ability to
generalize cross-culturally about psychological processes and mental illnesses.
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Another classic field for the study of folk concepts is the explanation of misfortune, including
illness and death, in terms of magical human causation. This is obviously connected to the work
on folk medical concepts. Many have wondered whether a belief in witches and sorcerers is
rational or whether it expresses an alternative rationality. The study of the rationality of beliefs
in witches led to the question of whether foreign cultures can be understood at all. E. E. EvansPritchard’s 1937 study of witch beliefs among the Azande people of the Sudan set off a
longstanding debate among philosophers about the rationality of such beliefs and the
comprehensibility of foreign cultural belief systems (Horton & Finnegan, 1973; Wilson, 1970). In
addition to concepts about magical causation through witchcraft and sorcery, folk concepts
about time have received considerable attention (Munn, 1992). These investigations reveal folk
metaphysics.
A more mundane area for investigation of folk concepts has been the area of kinship studies,
with anthropologists studying the principles whereby people were reckoned to be related to
one another, and the meaning of vernacular kinship terms in both theory and practice. Here,
too, anthropologists have sought to define dimensions of contrast and components of meaning.
Much of the main research in the “ethnoscience” tradition of cognitive anthropology used
componential analysis to account for levels of contrast used to define kinship terms. Any given
language’s list of kinship terms is small enough that an entire vocabulary can be identified, and
one can study the dimensions of contrast between terms. The study of kinship concepts
extends outward toward research on concepts concerning gender, age, and interpersonal
relations, and inward toward concepts of the person or self.
As with conceptual analysis itself, the concept of the person or self is most frequently
approached from the angles of philosophy and psychology. Anthropologists have challenged
the supposition that the concept of the self is universal, noting that it is culturally shaped in
many ways. Anthropology’s role in studying the concept of the person is to reveal cultural
patterns in these notions. One of the first such studies was A. Irving Hallowell’s (1967) work on
the Ojibwa Indians. More recent work has paid attention to notions about emotions,
intentionality, action, hierarchy (as in race or caste), thought, and consciousness. Some, like
Howell (1989), have linked concepts of the nature of the human being to larger cosmological
systems and notions about life in traditional societies.
Biographical interviews, as well as folklore and origin myths, can yield data about culturally
specific senses of the self. In some theories, the self is a social construct rather than a
psychological one, and in some ways, the self is culturally constituted. According to Hallowell,
culture provides multiple orientations through language: self-orientation, object-orientation,
spatiotemporal orientation, motivation, and norms. Concepts can also relate to interpersonal
relations, as with jealousy and commitment.
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Another area for investigation of folk concepts has been the understanding of the natural
environment, including concepts about plants and animals—how they are perceived,
categorized, and classified. While ethnobiology includes some exotic topics, such as
supernatural characteristics associated with plants and animals, it is more frequently concerned
with utilitarian issues, such as the usability of trees in construction or firewood. Most significant
in ethno-biology has been the study of the hierarchical ordering of concepts and vocabulary
about plants and animals from the most general to the most specific levels (Berlin, 1992). The
study of ethnobiology also encompasses empirical knowledge about the natural environment
and traditional means of managing resources (Ellen et al., 2000).
Mention should also be made of studies of sociopolitical folk concepts: value systems and
notions about race, ethnicity, and other social groupings. A classic groundbreaking
ethnographic study of sociopolitical concepts in a nonstate society is Edmund Leach’s Political
Systems of Highland Burma (1954), which looked at contrasting ideologies and theories of rival
groupings about themselves and their enemies within a single larger society, the Kachin.
Folklore is an obvious source of data on folk concepts. Besides stories, legends, folktales, myths,
proverbs, and axioms, data also come from jokes, riddles, songs, superstitions, and other
genres. In addition to verbal and narrative arts, there are games, charms, handicrafts, and other
nonverbal genres that come under the larger category of folklore. All of these involve
conceptual systems.
Schema Theory
In understanding a cultural concept, it is not enough to know only what it identifies; one must
also know the expectations, feelings, and motivations regarding it. In other words, part of the
meaning of a cultural concept concerns associations causing happiness, anxiety, and other
emotions. The full meaning of a concept is situated in a larger semantic field. In studying folk
concepts, one also wants to know how much what it means or represents is valued, how much
it is shared, whether it is considered true (e.g., Santa Claus is a ubiquitous and well-defined
folkloric person representing many things, but he is not believed to be a real person), whether
it is thought to represent the whole society, and whether it is associated with any restrictions or
prohibitions.
The contemporary anthropological view of the meaning of concepts concerns schemas (or
schemata), or cultural models. Schemas are the way people understand whole scenes. They are
the unspoken meanings embedded in cultural models, and they include not only what a
concept identifies but also the expectations, feelings, and motivations surrounding it. A schema
is a simplified scenario; it may be well theorized, inarticulate, or somewhere in between. To
understand the notion of schemas, one can imagine observing a high school setting and seeing
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students dressed in various ways, wearing different kinds of accoutrements and accessories,
and having different styles of behavior and speech. A knowledgeable informant might identify
numerous subcultures among the students, each associated with certain television shows, kinds
of music, preferences in food, automobiles, and many other things. These associations are the
schemas. Schemas enable us to make sense of artistic works, such as paintings and
photography, since they provide narrative stories implicit in a scene. The association of ideas in
schemas works automatically in members of a culture (or subculture) but must be explained to
outsiders and those who, like ethnographers, visitors, or journalists, are learning the culture. To
master a kinesthetic procedure (such as weaving), it is necessary to practice it rather than just
have it explained.
From interviews, it is possible to develop schemas. Agar and Hobbs (1985) gave an example of
how such analysis might proceed in the case of a person telling the story of how he became a
burglar. Their analysis shows causation and action in terms of behavior and identifies elements
of the schema: hustling, fencing stolen goods, being ratted out, getting busted, and so forth.
Quinn (2005), as noted above, also discovered and formulated schemas that she found
embedded in narratives. She found the work to be highly laborious, since it required the
collection of extended interviews, all of which needed to be transcribed. Only when she pored
over multiple transcripts did the schemas emerge. In her analysis of schemas, Quinn
reconstructed implicit, culturally shared assumptions from statements.
Psychological and anthropological approaches to schemas are complementary. Unlike the
psychological study of mental models, the anthropological approach used by Strauss and Quinn
(1997) among others (Casson, 1983) looks for shared cultural models that underlie and affect
an individual’s constructs. Psychologists, unlike anthropologists, examine the conceptformation process at an individual level.
In Shore’s (1996) complex taxonomy of cultural models (his term for what others have called
schemas), conceptual models, which he combined with expressive models, are but one of
several functional forms of models, the others being orientational, spatial, and task-oriented.
Conceptual/expressive models he divided into classificatory models, ludic models, ritual and
dramatic models, and theories. For Shore, the most important cultural model is the
foundational schema, which organizes and links other schemas together.
D’Andrade (1984) presented a readily accessible example of a cultural construct: the concept of
“success” in American culture. D’Andrade asserted that success can be understood as a domain
that can be elucidated through an explication of related terms that are components of success:
accomplishment, recognition, hard work, prestige, self-satisfaction, and others. The model of
success is used in many schemas, in that we can think of things that lead to success in a given
domain of life. Within the domain of success itself, we can find putative causal relationships
12

among terms. For example, hard work leads to recognition and is accompanied by selfsatisfaction.
Future Directions
As an older, established academic field, anthropology is being swept up in a movement of new
interdisciplinary formations and is being absorbed by other disciplines more than it absorbs
other disciplines. As such, the future of anthropology is in its contributions to emerging fields of
knowledge. The ethnographic approach to concepts fills a gap in a broad multidisciplinary
science of cognition by focusing on culturally shared meanings and models. Possible
contributions lie in science and technology studies, environmental science, and health studies,
along with more traditional applied fields such as management and education. The
ethnographic approach to folk concepts also has applications in consumer research and in
settings such as offices, hospitals, and libraries, and in city and regional planning.
The emerging field of knowledge organization, which grew out of library and information
science, is in a position to take advantage of the anthropological approach to concepts.
Knowledge organization research not only tends to focus on documented knowledge but also
recognizes undocumented modes of knowledge. Hjørland’s (2009) survey of concept theory, in
connection with frameworks for the theory of knowledge (empiricism, rationalism, historicism,
and pragmatism), illustrates how the documentation and study of folk concepts fit into broader
intellectual movements.
The growth of social networking over the Internet presents new opportunities and challenges
for the ethnographic study of folk concepts in cyberspace. Sites such as Second Life create
virtual worlds in which users interact through the use of avatars. These sites provide
opportunities for persons to communicate, collaborate, and present themselves in ways never
before possible (Turkle, 1995). In doing ethnography in such a space, anthropologists might
choose to create their own avatars and interact with users in the virtual environment rather
than try to meet informants in the flesh. Such an unorthodox approach can be justified by
reasoning that the entire user community exists online rather than in “real life” and may never
meet face to face.
In addition, many Web sites allow users to tag objects and ideas and to relate to others
interested in the same domain (Weinberger, 2007). Web 2.0 technology has spawned social
networking sites, such as Delicious and Flickr, that encourage users to label content with their
own tags. Such tags have evolved into folksonomies, user-driven classification systems that
bring out nonhierarchical relationships between individual tags. The concepts emerging from
such environments are part of new cultural formations that transcend fixed locations. Such
environments lend themselves to ethnographic research strategies, even though the particular
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techniques are vastly different from those of traditional ethnography. In a remarkable study,
Jenkins (2001) was able to observe the underground culture of pedophiles entirely by gaining
access to online child pornography bulletin board systems and reading messages posted by
participants without downloading illegal images. Of course, the study of cyberculture can also
be integrated in to, or added on to, more traditional research methods. Ethnographers can also
participate in emerging forms of interaction based on new information technologies, such as
text messaging, instant messaging, and the exchange of digital audio, image, and audiovisual
files.
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